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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores the nature of emotions by considering what appear to be two 
differing, perhaps even conflicting, approaches to affectivity—an evolutionary 
functional account, on the one hand, and a phenomenological view, on the other. The 
paper argues for the centrality of the notion of function in both approaches, articulates 
key differences between them, and attempts to understand how such differences can 
be overcome. 
 
“Divinity must live within herself:  
Passions of rain, or moods in falling snow;  
Grievings in loneliness, or unsubdued 
Elations when the forest blooms; gusty  
Emotions on wet roads on autumn nights; 
All pleasures and all pains, remembering 
The bough of summer and the winter branch.  
These are the measures destined for her soul” 
Sunday Morning — Wallace Stevens 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Investigations into the nature of emotions—philosophical, psychological, 
medical, historical, or otherwise—often begin with a truism: emotions are 
ubiquitous to human life. The truism is a truism because it is true. A recent large-
scale study utilized a free mobile application in order to measure various aspects 
of the users’ psychological experiences by prompting them to answer short 
questionnaires at random times throughout the day (Trampe et al., 2015). More 
than 60,000 users downloaded the application and the researchers collected 
half a million completed questionnaires. What they found, not surprisingly, was 
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that our lives are awash with emotions. On average, individuals reported 
experiencing one or more emotions 90% of the time. The most popular positive 
emotion was joy (35% of the time); the most popular negative emotion was anxiety 
(29% of the time). For 33% of the time, individuals experience at least one positive 
and one negative emotion simultaneously. “[E]veryday human life,” the researchers 
conclude, “is profoundly emotional” (p.10).  
But why is the truism true? Why are we the emotional beings that we are? Both 
evolutionary functional and phenomenological accounts of emotions offer their own 
answers to the why question and in doing so, address the telos or purpose of 
emotions. Despite obvious and profound differences between these two accounts—
chief amongst them phenomenology’s antipathy to the naturalism essential to 
evolutionary functional theories—a comparison between the two is of value. Just like 
evolutionary functional views, the phenomenological view of emotions that will be 
my focus in this paper not only ascribes functions to emotions, but also individuates 
them in terms of those functions. What is more, the phenomenological account 
insists on the bodily features of emotions and cites them as part of the character of 
emotions. Phenomenology thus appears to be both akin to and fundamentally 
opposed to evolutionary functional accounts of emotions. My aim in this paper is to 
make explicit phenomenology’s standing in relation to such approaches and to show 
that a measuring of the logical distance separating these two views can help us 
understand both the limits and distinctive contributions of phenomenology. 
 
2. Emotions as Solutions: From Function to Biology 
“An emotion is a bet placed under conditions of uncertainty: it is the evolved 
mind’s bet about what internal deployment is likely to lead to the best average 
long-term set of payoffs, given the structure and statistical contingencies present 
in the ancestral world when a particular situation was encountered.” 
 (Tooby  & Cosmides 2008, p. 117) 
 
2.1. A Quick Overview 
Emotions form a proper subset of the superordinate category of affective 
phenomena. According to most psychological and neuroscientific accounts, 
emotions are relatively short-lived, flexible, multicomponent patterns and 
tendencies that occur in response to specific physical and social situations. 
Emotions are typically initiated by an individual’s appraisal or assessment of an event 
that bears some personal significance to them (Frijda, 1986; Oatley & Johnson-
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Laird, 1987; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1993; Smith & Lazarus, 1993; Lazarus, 
1991). The appraisal can be either conscious or unconscious and it gives rise to a 
cascade of interrelated responses in the individual, such as changes in subjective 
(felt) experiences, physiology, facial expressions, volitional attitudes, cognition, and 
behavior.  
Many emotion researchers take emotions to be associated with and partly 
characterized by the specific action or thought tendencies that they bring about 
(Frijda, 1986; Lazarus, 1991; Levenson, 1994; Oatley & Jenkins, 1996; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 1990). Such specific tendencies are often aligned with physiological 
changes that an individual undergoes during the emotional episodes and 
consequently render emotions advantageous. Anger, for example, is associated with 
an urge to attack and physically prepares the individual to do so (Fredrickson, 
2000). Whereas negative emotions typically narrow a person’s momentary thought 
or action repertoire—in fear, e.g., one is inclined to flee, fight, or freeze, but not to 
mind-wander or to take interest in their surroundings—positive emotions (e.g., joy, 
interest) are thought to broaden one’s momentary thought or action repertoire 
(Fredrickson, 1998, 2001, 2005; Fredrickson & Branigan, 2005; Fredrickson & 
Cohn, 2008; Fredrickson & Joiner, 2002).  
Functional accounts of emotions emphasize that emotions are best understood 
in terms of the functions that they serve. Such accounts are interested in figuring out 
why we have the emotions that we do (e.g., Averill, 1990; Frijda, 1994; Keltner & 
Gross, 1999; Keltner & Haidt, 1999; Keltner & Kring, 1998; Levenson, 1994; 
Niedenthal & Brauer, 2012; Oatley & Jenkins, 1992; Plutchik, 2001; Scherer, 
1984 and 1994; see also Cosmides & Tooby, 2000; Nesse, 1991; Tooby & 
Cosmides, 2008). Functional accounts of emotions need not be thought of as 
competitors to views of emotions that explicate them in terms of their action or 
thought tendencies. Rather, they can be understood as offering a complementary 
take on the nature and character of emotions by adding a specification of why the 
emotions in question have the features that they do. As a general answer to the 
question of why emotions exist, functional accounts hold that emotions are solutions 
to problems of physical or social survival (Keltner, Haidt, and Shiota, 2006; Keltner 
& Gross, 1999; Weisfeld & Goetz, 2013).  
 
2.2. The Meaning of “Function” 
Functional accounts of emotions emphasize that emotions serve a function and 
such a function is crucial in understanding their nature. But what exactly does 
the term “function” mean? 
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It is customary to draw a distinction between minimal function and 
teleological (or proper) function (Neander, 2017). A minimal function of an 
entity is simply something that the entity does or an effect that the entity has. 
A teleological function of an entity is what the entity does that explains its 
presence (Wright, 1973). It should be clear that not every capacity or effect of 
something counts as the teleological function of that thing. The presence of a 
heart is partly explained by its function to pump blood but not by its capacity 
to make a sound. Although both capacities could be called “functions,” only 
the former counts as teleological. Teleological functions figure prominently 
in biology and evolutionary psychology, and are distinguished from non-
teleological functions (minimal or otherwise) (e.g., Cummins, 1975) insofar 
ascriptions of such functions answer why questions (e.g., Allen & Bekoff, 
1995; Ayala, 1977; Godfrey-Smith, 1993 and 1994; Griffiths, 1993; 
Häggqvist, 2013; Keltner & Gross, 1999; Kraemer, 2014; Millikan, 1989; 
Mitchell, 1993; Neander, 1991a, 1991b; Saborido, 2014; Walsh & Ariew, 
1996; Wright, 1973).  
The teleological function of an entity need not always be performed. In 
certain cases, it will be performed only infrequently—e.g., the function of a 
sperm is to fertilize ovae and yet only a small minority succeeds in doing so 
(Häggqvist, 2013). In other cases, the function might never be performed. 
Caged animals in zoos are not given the opportunity to exercise some of the 
teleological functions that their organs and body parts possess (Neander, 
2017). Finally, a teleological function can malfunction, either because the 
organism or item that has such a function is defective or because 
environmental circumstances prevent the execution of such function.  
Many accounts of teleological functions are etiological: they explicate the 
function of an item in terms of its past selection. Such accounts hold that the 
function of an item is to perform what the item was (or what items of the same 
type were) selected to perform (Neander, 2017). Etiological articulations of 
an item’s function thus refer both to its history and to its regular 
consequences. The most common account of an etiological articulation of 
teleological function is an evolutionary one that holds that functions are 
grounded in natural selection. According to such an account, if X has 
teleological function F, then: 
 
(a) F explains why X is present (why it exists and why it is maintained); 
    and 
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(b) F is causally relevant to the presence of X via the mechanism of natural 
selection (i.e., X exists because it performs F and because F confers to X 
[or to an organism that has X] an evolutionary advantage) (see Allen & 
Bekoff, 1995; Sober 2000, p. 85) 
 
For example, the heart’s ability to pump blood would count as its 
teleological function. Hearts exist partially because by pumping blood they 
confer to an organism an evolutionary advantage. Of course, not every 
etiological articulation of teleological function has to be an evolutionary one. 
Other forms of selection include intentional selection, social or cultural 
selection, or neural selection (Garson, 2012; Neander, 2017). However, for 
the case of emotions, I shall assume, following evolutionary functional views, 
that most emotions are the products of evolution (either adaptations or 
exaptations) even if they can be influenced greatly by cultural factors (Keltner, 
Haidt, and Shiota, 2006).  
 
2.3. From Function to Evolution 
Assuming an evolutionary understanding of teleological functions, the claim 
that an emotion E has teleological function F amounts to the following series 
of claims: (a) our evolutionary ancestors experienced E; (b) their experience 
of E had the effect which we now call the teleological function of the emotion 
under question, F; and (c) having that effect explains the presence of emotion 
E in humans insofar as E exists because F conferred an adaptive advantage on 
individuals who were capable of experiencing E (see Griffiths, 1993; Neander, 
1991a). How can one justify such a wide-reaching account of emotions?  
Many emotion theorists find no difficulty in answering this call for 
justification. They cite the integral and necessary roles that emotions play in 
our lives and conclude that emotions must exist because of their adaptive 
functions. Emotions, they point out, have many intra- and inter-organismic 
benefits and as such, they bring account systematic and beneficial 
consequences. They provide us with information both about the match or 
mismatch between organism and environment (Schwarz & Clore, 1983) and 
about our goals (Carver, 2001); they organize response systems (Levenson, 
1994); they allow us to detect and respond to physical and social challenges; 
they can facilitate decision-making (Oatley & Johnson-Laird, 1987; Schwarz, 
2000; Bagozzi et al., 1998; Leone et al., 2005); they structure and prioritize 
actions and cognitive processes (Clore, 1994, Levenson, 1994; Simon, 
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1967); they promote flexibility by decoupling stimuli from responses 
(Scherer, 1984 and 1994); they prepare us for action and move us in ways that 
promote the achievement of goals (Bagozzi et al., 2000); and lastly, they serve 
many social functions such as promoting cooperation and group relationships 
(e.g., Frank, 1988; Gonzaga et al., 2001;  Keltner et al., 2006; Nesse, 1991; 
Shiota et al., 2004; Trivers, 1971).  
Reflecting on the many effects that emotions have on our lives, the claim 
that emotions have teleological functions is dictated, according to proponents 
of the evolutionary functional view, by an inference to the best explanation. 
Emotions have the functions that they have because they were ‘selected’ (by 
evolutionary forces) to have them. As Keltner, Haidt, and Shiota (2006, p. 
117) write, “[e]motions have the hallmarks of adaptations: They are efficient, 
coordinated responses that help organisms to reproduce, to protect offspring, 
to maintain cooperative alliances, and to avoid physical threats.” For the 
evolutionary functionalists, emotions are thus not only minimally functional 
but also teleologically functional: their benefits or functions account for their 
presence. Emotions have evolved precisely because of their adaptive functions 
in genotypic and phenotypic survival (Hasselton & Ketelaar, 2006; Ketelaar, 
2004).  
The evolutionary functional account is, of course, not the only scientifically 
acceptable account of emotions. Nor is it free of problems (Barrett, 2006; 
Downes, 2017; Lench et al., 2015). All the same, the evolutionary functional 
story offers an answer—albeit somewhat programmatic and contentious—to the 
ubiquity of emotions. We are emotional beings because we have been shaped 
to be so by ancestrally structured and evolutionarily recurrent situations 
(Tooby & Cosmides, 1990). And even if evolutionary functional views of 
emotions may fail to account for the presence of certain emotions that do not 
appear to be the obvious solutions to ancestral difficulties, a functional (but 
non-evolutionary) view could do better. The selection of certain emotions 
could have come through cultural and social difficulties, one that cannot be 
reduced to biological difficulties. Ultimately, functional accounts of emotions 
explain the emergence of emotions by citing their teleological functions. 
Emotions are ubiquitous because, as living, embodied and social organisms, 
we are in (biological or social) need of them.  
 
 
 
   On Affect: Function and Phenomenology                                        161 
 
3. Phenomenology and Emotions 
 
 “My emotional account was always overdrawn.” 
 Humboldt’s Gift – Saul Bellow  
 
3.1. The Need for a Phenomenology of Emotions 
“Science is the measure of all things, of what is that it is, and of what is not that 
it is not” (Sellars, 1991, p.173). It is not just scientists who live by Sellars’ 
description of the explanatory and ontological priority of science; many 
philosophers do too—and for good reasons. As psychological phenomena, 
emotions appear to be both biologically and physically grounded and subject to 
the predictive and manipulative power of our brain sciences. But then why 
should there be a need for a philosophy of emotions? What is distinctive about 
or endemic to philosophical discourse that is lacking in scientific investigations 
of the same subject matter? 
Such a meta-philosophical worry has been addressed before. First, it has 
been suggested that philosophy differs from science in terms of its methodology. 
Philosophers’ engagement in conceptual, logical, or a priori analyses is not only 
unique to philosophy but also necessary to understanding properly scientific 
findings and to rendering them free of conceptual and logical inconsistencies. 
Second, it is said that it is philosophy and philosophy alone that can offer a 
synoptic picture of the world. Whereas scientific investigations have 
circumscribed subject matters, philosophy does not; philosophy is in the 
business of bridge building—it can offer systematic and comprehensive 
presentations of the empirical literature with an eye toward presenting a picture 
(a big picture) of human existence. Third, and somewhat relatedly, philosophy 
goes beyond science insofar as it is both descriptive and normative. As such, 
philosophy tells us what the sciences cannot, namely, how the world and human 
conduct ought to be. 
All three answers have merit and a ring of plausibility, yet none of them is 
specific to the philosophy of emotions. At best, what they provide us with are 
reasons to believe in the value of philosophy. Thus, if we conclude from the 
aforementioned that there is a need for a philosophy of emotions, then such a 
need would share its origin with the need for the philosophies of perception, of 
law, or of economics, just to name a few. 
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Within phenomenology,1 however, a more direct answer to the question of 
the need of a philosophy of emotion can be discerned. When we turn to 
phenomenology, we find not only a justification of the value of phenomenology 
(and thus of philosophy as such) but also an explicit articulation of the need for 
a phenomenological study of emotions. Phenomenology offers, it is said, a 
unique perspective to affectivity, one that can be captured neither by science nor 
by other philosophical approaches.  
Phenomenology’s insight is simple: affective phenomena are ontologically 
significant. What that means is that issues concerning the nature of human 
existence and the character of affective experiences are necessarily 
interconnected. By articulating our affective experiences we are at the same time 
laying bare the conditions for the possibility of human existence. For the 
phenomenologist, we do not first exist in some non-affective way and only then 
we are emotionally affected by the world. Rather, we exist in the world only 
insofar as we can be emotionally affected. Any study of human condition that 
‘sees’ our emotional capacities as an add-on of human existence—something that 
is separable from what makes us human and which can be studied in isolation—
is, according to phenomenology, fundamentally misguided. 
Thus, “affectivity” does not denote a set of experiences or a class of mental 
phenomena that demand classification or a precise articulation of their 
character; most fundamentally, the term denotes instead an ontological 
structure—a way, the human way, of existing in the world and through which all 
aspects of human existence (including theoretical reasoning about affectivity 
itself) must necessarily be understood. Such a characterization of affectivity 
offers an explicit answer to the question of why we need a phenomenology (and 
thus a philosophy) of emotions. A phenomenology of emotions is necessary for 
without it, we cannot hope to come to terms with human existence—affectivity 
is, after all, a constitutive part of human existence. What is more, the requisite 
investigation of affectivity must be philosophical and not scientific for only the 
former, due to the fact that it is both reflexive and synthetic, can articulate the 
interconnections between affectivity and human nature. Or so the 
phenomenological story goes. 
Phenomenology however also offers an explanation for the ubiquity of 
emotions in human life. Our everyday existence is permeated by affective 
experiences because we are the type of beings who are susceptible to those 
 
1 The term “phenomenology” is used in this paper to denote the movement in the history of philosophy that 
originated with Edmund Husserl. 
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experiences. It is, in other words, due to our ontological constitution that 
emotions and affective experiences are everywhere. Without them, we would 
not be able to inhabit a world of value and personal significance. For the 
phenomenologists, human existence is necessarily emotional existence.  
The phenomenological view of emotions just described is epitomized by 
Martin Heidegger’s existential phenomenology and specifically, by his 
ontological/ontic distinction between Befindlichkeit (“findingness” or 
“disposedness”) and Stimmung (mood). The former is a basic ontological 
structure of human existence. It is that which makes it possible for human beings 
to find themselves situated in or attuned to the world in a way that is both 
meaningful to them affectively laden (Elpidorou, 2013; Elpidorou and 
Freeman, 2015; Freeman, 2014; Freeman and Elpidorou, 2015; Slaby, 2015). 
Befindlichkeit, Heidegger writes, is the “finding of oneself in being-in-the-
world” and “belongs with being-in-the-world as such” (Heidegger 
1979/1992, p. 352/255; translation altered). Whereas Befindlichkeit is an 
ontological structure, moods (Stimmungen) are the various, specific, and pre-
reflective ways in which we relate to the world and ourselves. Moods shape the 
manner in which the world appears to us; they ‘open’ it up insofar as it is also 
through them that the world is disclosed to us. Insofar as Befindlichkeit belongs 
to the structure of human existence, we are then always in some mood or another 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962, §29). We are always in moods but not because 
moods are the internal (or subjective) states of mind that accompany us 
everywhere and provide the affective ‘soundtrack’ of our lives; nor is it because 
they exist independently or outside of us. Rather, we are always in some mood 
because moods belong to and constitute our existence. They are an indelible 
part of human life; they are, as Heidegger writes, the “fundamental ways in which 
we find ourselves disposed in such and such a way” (Heidegger 1983/1995, p. 
101/67; see also Heidegger, 1927/1962, §29).  
Even though Heidegger’s understanding of affectivity exemplifies 
phenomenology’s central insight into the ontological significance of emotions, 
my focus in this paper will not be on (early) Heidegger. Instead, I focus on Jean-
Paul Sartre, and specifically on his account of emotions as this is given primarily 
in his Sketch for a Theory of Emotions. My (perhaps not obvious) choice to focus 
on Sartre is motivated by the following three key features of Sartre’s account. 
First, although Sartre shares Heidegger’s conviction of the significance of 
affectivity, unlike Heidegger, he deems it necessary to engage in a critical 
dialogue with the psychological sciences. Second, Sartre’s view of emotions is 
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embodied; Heidegger’s is not. Third, in articulating his view on emotions, 
Sartre makes explicit use of the function of emotions. These three features of 
Sartre’s position allow us to draw a meaningful comparison between his 
phenomenological view on emotions and evolutionary functional views.  
 
3.2.  Sartre on Emotions 
The Sartrean view of emotions holds that emotions are embodied, enactive, 
and unreflective ways of existing in and engaging with the world that aim to 
resolve insurmountable difficulties.2 Although during our emotional episodes 
we could turn inwards, so to speak, and make our emotions and ourselves the 
intentional objects of our affective experiences, we rarely do—and even if we 
were to do so, our emotional experiences would be significantly transformed. 
Emotions, for Sartre, are first and foremost “a specific manner of 
apprehending the world.” (STE 35)3 And as ways of apprehending the world, 
we are aware of our own consciousness only pre-reflectively. As Sartre writes, 
“The emotional consciousness is at first non-reflective, and upon that plane it 
cannot be consciousness of itself, except in the non-positional mode.” (STE 
34) Emotions are thus not experiences of ‘internal’ psychological states, but 
of the world. In fact, they are not mere experiences (if by that we mean passive 
happenings), but active ways of interacting with and disclosing the world.  
As ways of existing, emotions bring about a purposeful transformation in 
the manner in which we experience the world. “The onset of emotion,” Sartre 
states, “is a complete modification of the ‘being-in-the-world’ (STE 63). 
Before the onset of our (strong)4 emotional experiences, we find ourselves 
immersed in a world characterized by concerns, obligations, and possibilities. 
We experience the world as “hodological” (STE 38)—as containing hodoi 
(roads)—i.e., as being governed by a plurality of means-ends relationships: 
“The world around us…appears to be all furrowed with strait and narrow paths 
 
2  Here I offer only a brief description of Sartre’s account of emotions and thus concentrate almost exclusively 
on the claims that he makes in the Sketch. My focus, however, should not be taken to mean that the Sketch is 
the only place in which Sartre talks about emotions nor that it is the only text worth considering when it comes 
to the topic of emotions. For more comprehensive attempts to articulate Sartre’s views on the emotions see, 
among others, Barnes (1984), Elpidorou (2017) and Fell (1965). 
3  All references to Sartre (1939/2004) and Sartre (1943/1984) will be indicated respectively by “STE” and 
“BN” followed in both cases by the pagination of the English translation.  
4  This qualification is necessary because Sartre’s theory works best for strong emotional reactions. In the 
Sketch, he does offer an all-too-brief description of two other kinds of emotions, “subtle emotions” and “weak 
emotions” (STE 55). For a discussion of how one can make sense of different types of emotions and affective 
phenomena using Sartre’s phenomenology, see L. R. Barrett (1982), Elpidorou (2017), and Fell (1965). 
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leading to such and such determinate end” (STE 39). Worldly entities, other 
persons, and situations all stand in such relations to each other forming a 
causal and pragmatic nexus. In this everyday and concernful mode, the world 
appears to be both instrumental and deterministic: our desired ends can be 
achieved only by the attainment of prescribed and fixed means while, at the 
same time, we remain subject to rules and laws—those of physics and society, 
of biology and economics. Precisely because of the instrumental and 
deterministic nature of our everyday existence it is unavoidable that we will 
encounter situations that do not yield to our desires—either because we cannot 
readily procure the means leading to our desired ends or because the 
necessary means of achieving those ends are missing. The world is exacting 
and difficult. And it makes demands that we are not always capable of meeting.  
Sometimes we will be able to overcome our experienced difficulties using 
ordinary (that is, practical) means—when one plan falls apart, another might 
materialize. Sometimes we succeed; other times, however, we do not. And 
when we do not, when we are faced with a pressing and insurmountable 
obstacle, emotions arise. By interacting with a world that does not yield to our 
desires, we are changed; we become emotional, and with us the world itself is 
changed. Sartre explains: 
 
We can now conceive what an emotion is. It is a transformation of the world. 
When the paths before us become too difficult, or when we cannot see our 
way, we can no longer put up with such an exacting and difficult world. All 
ways are barred and nevertheless we must act. So then we try to change the 
world; that is to live it as though the relations between things and their 
potentialities were not governed by deterministic processes but by magic. 
(STE 39-40) 
 
Sartre describes the world that emotional consciousness reveals as magical. 
It is so partly because it possesses qualities unlike the ones that we 
encountered before. For example, disgust changes innocuous objects into 
repulsive ones; anxiety renders familiar situations overwhelming; and 
contempt makes a person unworthy, morally inferior. Emotional 
consciousness confers such qualities to the world without however bringing 
about a material transformation. The world is not really changed; only our 
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consciousness of it is. Importantly, and concurrently with the formation5 of 
these new qualities, the world of emotions is revealed as magical also because it 
is not “governed by deterministic processes” (ibid.) To say that deterministic 
processes do not characterize our emotional existence is not to assert that 
somehow physical laws cease to apply. Rather, what has changed during our 
emotional episodes is that the rigid means-ends relationships that previously 
dictated our concernful, everyday existence no longer apply. It is precisely 
because of this feature that emotions are capable of providing solutions to 
experienced difficulties.  
During emotional episodes, we can achieve the desired ends without 
procuring the means that previously appeared to us to be absolutely necessary. 
A fit of anger, for instance, offers an escape from a losing argument, not by 
helping us to deal with the argument or to outsmart our interlocutor—we can do 
neither. Rather, with the help of anger we impose our view on our interlocutor 
by yelling and silencing them, or by walking away before they have a chance to 
respond. Moreover, by changing the manner in which we perceive the world, 
emotions can also solve experienced difficulties by leading us to denounce a 
previously desired and cherished end and thus absolving us of the responsibility 
to act. Even if life appears to be unimaginable without some cherished end, 
certain emotions can drastically change our outlook. Sadness is one of them. By 
affectively neutralizing the world (STE 44), it offers us a much-needed respite 
from the world’s demands. When we are sad, nothing attracts us; no end appeals 
to us. Because of that, we need not act. 
Hence, emotions disclose to us a world in which the demands of our 
concernful existence cease, at least temporarily, to apply to us. In doing so, they 
attempt to offer solutions to experienced difficulties. Even if reality does not 
admit of an escape—as Sartre reminds us in a famous line from Nausea6—we can 
still relieve ourselves of its burdens by transforming it with our emotions.  
 
 
 
 
5  The new qualities that our emotions magically confer to the world are taken by us as real. “Consciousness 
does not limit itself to the projection of affective meanings upon the world around it; it lives the new world it 
has thereby constituted—lives it directly, commits itself to it, and suffers from the qualities that the concomitant 
behaviour has outlined.” (STE 51) 
6  “Existence is a plenum from which one cannot escape” (Sartre 1938/1964; translation altered).  
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3.3. The Function and Effectiveness of Sartrean Emotions 
There is a lot more that can be said about Sartre’s view of emotions. And indeed 
a lot has been said that is critical of his approach. Here I take up neither a critique 
nor a defense of Sartre—I and many others have done both elsewhere. 7  For 
present purposes, I accept the phenomenological account on offer and consider 
one specific application of this account in order to explicate further Sartre’s 
views regarding the function and purpose of emotions.  
Consider the emotion of fear. For Sartre, fear is not a monolithic experience. 
Indeed, in the Sketch, Sartre distinguishes between two distinct types of fear, 
active and passive. Both of them deserve the name “fear” because both arise on 
account of the perception of a threat to one’s well-being and because both, at 
least according to Sartre, attempt to negate the threat when deterministic means 
fail us. Still, the two types of fear are distinct because they attempt to negate the 
threat in different ways.  
In the case of active fear, we attempt to resolve the experienced difficulty 
(i.e., the threat) by fleeing. Flight in active fear “is magical behaviour which 
negates the dangerous object with one’s whole body, by reversing the vectorial 
structure of the space we live in it and suddenly creating a potential direction on 
the other side.” (STE 43) Because we cannot address the threat with 
deterministic means—because we cannot fight it, overpower it, or sustain it—we 
run from it. And by running away from it, we escape from it, but only in the sense 
that we have put it behind us. Fleeing “is a way of forgetting, of negating the 
danger,” Sartre writes (STE 43). It is crucial to Sartre’s view that we do not 
mistake fleeing for a calculative reaction to the perception of a threat. If it were 
so, it would not be the embodiment of an emotion but the deployment of a 
prudential strategy. We do not flee in order to escape, according to Sartre. 
Rather, we flee because we cannot deal with the threat. Fleeing is a solution only 
because there is no other (practical) solution. 
Just like active fear, passive fear is also an attempt to negate the threat. 
Whereas in active fear, we flee; in passive fear, we faint. As Sartre writes in an 
often quoted passage:  
 
I see a ferocious beast coming towards me: my legs give way under me, my heart 
beats more feebly, I turn pale, fall down and faint away. No conduct could seem 
 
7  See, for example, Anders (1950), L. R. Barrett (1982), Elpidorou (2016), (2017), Emerick (1999), Fell 
(1965), Hatzimoysis (2014), Richmond (2010), Solomon (2006), and Weberman (1996). 
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worse adapted to the danger than this, which leaves me defenceless. And 
nevertheless it is a behaviour of escape; the fainting away is a refuge. (STE 42) 
 
The threat in the case of passive fear is inescapable. We cannot fight it, but 
nor can we outrun it. We thus take the only action that is at our disposal. We 
annihilate it by annihilating our own consciousness. Passive fear, it seems, is a 
last-ditch effort to overcome an otherwise overwhelming and insuperable 
difficulty. 
The case of fear is instructive. It reveals that fear is functional insofar as it 
serves a purpose. And at least under one description, it shares its function with 
all emotions: fear, just like all other emotions, aims to offer a solution to an 
encountered difficulty that could not be resolved by instrumental, pragmatic 
means. Consequently, what makes fear an emotion is both its aim (its “finality”, 
to quote Sartre (STE 34, 58)), and the fact that such an aim can be accomplished 
only by transforming our instrumental world into a magical one. What makes 
fear fear is both the specific difficulty that gives rise to it and the way in which the 
experience of fear, by transforming our bodies and the world, attempts to resolve 
the difficult. Sartre’s account offers us a way of distinguishing emotions from 
other experiences and of individuating between different emotion types. 8  
The purposefulness of fear and indeed of all emotions9 appears to render 
Sartre’s phenomenological account akin to evolutionary functional views. After 
all, both endow emotions with functions and both individuate emotions in terms 
of their functions. Upon closer inspection however, such a similarity, although 
real and important, does not suffice to close the gap that separates the two views. 
The conflict between the two views is made evident once we focus on two 
characteristics of Sartrean emotions.  
First, emotions as magical transformations are rather meager ways of dealing 
with most threats. Thus, even though emotions are functional they are not so 
because they can objectively solve the difficulties that give rise to them. Such a 
conclusion follows not only from the fact that emotions arise after all other ways 
of dealing with the difficulty have failed, but also because emotional conduct, is, 
 
8  “In every case the problem is different, and the behaviour is different. To grasp the signification and aim, 
one would have to know and analyse each particular situation.” (STE 47-8) 
9  As readers of the Sketch know, it is unclear whether the Sketch contains a single and consistent account of 
emotions that can accommodate all examples of emotions that Sartre considers, including the sudden ones of 
horror and awe. For present purposes, it matters little whether and how one can resolve this interpretative 
difficulty. Even if fear cannot be used as a model for all emotions, it is still a model for most. 
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according to Sartre’s own admission, “not effectual” (STE 41). In elaborating 
on this point, he writes:  
 
Its aim is not really to act upon the object as it is, by the interpolation of 
particular means. Emotional behaviour seeks by itself, and without modifying 
the structure of the object, to confer another quality upon it. (ibid.) 
 
Without an ability to change materially the world, the effectiveness of 
emotions is substantially limited. In the case of passive fear, nothing is really 
gained by fainting. We might have forgotten the threat and negated it in our 
consciousness, but the threat has not forgotten us. It is still there. To quote 
Sartre, “Such are the limitations of my magical power over the world” (STE 42). 
Similar comments can be made about the inadequacy of anger, sadness, and 
most other emotions that fit Sartre’s model. Thus, whereas evolutionary 
accounts of emotions understand emotions in terms of their real, material effects 
that they have (or have had) on the world and ourselves, Sartre’s account 
understands emotion in terms of the effects that they have on our embodied and 
enactive consciousness. It is not emotions’ job to change our material 
conditions nor is it to confer to us any kind of biological (evolutionary) 
advantage. All that is beside the point for Sartre.  
Second, the function that emotions possess and which characterizes them is 
not biological but personal (or existential). According to Sartre, emotions are 
not mere happenings (or passions) (BN 445). Although emotions arise 
spontaneously, insofar as we do not choose to have our emotions, there is an 
important sense according to which emotions are our own and hence we are 
responsible for them. Our emotions are our own because our emotional conduct 
(when it arises and how it expresses itself) depends to a large extent on how we 
already structured our lives, priorities, and projects. But what this means for 
Sartre is that emotions as responses to existential difficulties cannot be 
understood from a third-person (objective) perspective. Indeed, if we were to 
adopt an evolutionary perspective, we would completely miss the nature of 
(Sartrean) emotions. Such affective experiences are neither possible nor 
meaningful outside the context of personal, and not just animal or biological, 
existence.  
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3.4. Sartre’s Critique of Psychology 
The aforementioned considerations suggest that if one adopts the 
phenomenological perspective, then affectivity in general and emotions in 
particular are placed out of reach of scientific (psychological or biological) 
approaches. The same conclusion regarding the limits of science also shows up 
in discussions of phenomenology’s critique of naturalism. Much has been 
written about this topic, so my remarks will be both succinct and specific 
to Sartre.10 By addressing this issue, my aim is to show how Sartre’s own 
criticisms of psychology support the assessment reached in the previous 
subsection, namely, that, for the phenomenologist, phenomenological and 
evolutionary ways of thinking about emotions are worlds apart. 11  
In the introductory section of the Sketch, a part of the book often 
neglected by commentators, Sartre lays out his criticisms of a scientific, 
mainly psychological, approach to affectivity. His aim is twofold: first, to 
criticize psychology by highlighting its limits as an empirical investigation 
of human nature; and second, to motivate a phenomenological study of 
emotions by showing how phenomenology, by going beyond psychology, 
is uniquely suited to uncover essential features of human existence.  
Sartre’s criticism of psychology stems from his contention that 
psychology is a discipline that is empirical through and through. 
Psychology’s primary concern is the collection of facts about the human 
psyche. But psychological and scientific facts are by their very nature 
incapable of carving out the essence of the lived experience of emotions, 
and consequently of articulating the nature of human existence. Although 
the reality and existence of emotions is readily admitted by psychology, the 
existence of emotions can only be treated as an accident. For psychology, 
emotions are just another class of psychological phenomena. They are “ the 
subject of one chapter after the other chapters, much as in chemical 
treatises calcium might come after hydrogen and sulphur.” (STE 5)  
Why does Sartre think that psychological (and scientific) facts about 
emotions cannot amount to a satisfactory conception of emotions and of 
their constitutive role in human existence? Sartre highlights three 
interconnected features of psychological facts that render them 
 
10  For some discussions about the prospects of naturalizing phenomenology and what that exactly means see: 
De Preester (2006), Gallagher (2012), Moran (2013), Petitot et al. (1999), Yoshimi (2015), and Zahavi 
(2013). 
11 My discussion of Sartre’s criticisms of psychology draws upon Elpidorou (2017). 
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fundamentally unsuitable for an understanding of the ontological and 
existential significance of emotions.  
First, psychological facts are fragmentary insofar as they are given to 
researchers not already as part of a synthetic whole but as atomistic and 
disconnected from other facts. Psychologists, for Sartre, do not have 
access to an a priori conception of human nature—as an empirical 
enterprise, psychology precludes such access. Thus, from the perspective of 
psychology, the discovery of each and every fact must then be taken on its own. 
However meticulous and comprehensive such an empirical undertaking may be, 
it is severely limited: it “can furnish no more than a sum of heteroclite facts” 
(STE 4). As a result, psychology, Sartre holds, fails to provide a holistic and 
structured picture of human existence (STE 6-7, 13).  
 Second, in virtue of being fragmentary, psychological facts are also non-
significant insofar as they do not and cannot signify anything beyond themselves. 
“For the psychologist emotion signifies nothing,” Sartre writes, “because he 
studies it as a fact; that is, by separating from everything else” (STE 11). Facts 
must then be accepted at face value. In other words, facts are what they are, what 
they appear to be, and nothing more than that. Thus, psychology cannot connect 
emotions to human nature and existence. And it misses the (phenomenological) 
point of affectivity for it is simply incapable of seeing how affectivity relates to—
constitutes and is constituted by—human nature. “[I]f every human fact is in 
truth significant,” as phenomenology holds it to be, then “this emotion of the 
psychologists is of its nature dead, non-psychic, inhuman” (ibid.). 
Phenomenology and psychology appear to be studying distinct phenomena.  
Lastly, and as a joint result of their fragmentary and non-significant 
character, psychological facts can only describe accidental features of human 
existence. Psychology cannot go behind the facts, so to speak, and uncover what 
gives rise to those facts. “[T]he psychologist, questioned about emotion, is quite 
proud to affirm: ‘It exists. Why? I know nothing of that, I simply state the fact” 
(ibid.). Psychology cannot reveal to us the structures of human existence that 
make affectivity possible in the first place. It is empirical, not transcendental. 
Because of that, it inevitably fails to come to terms with human reality. 
Unlike psychology that remains bound to its empirical scruples, 
phenomenology can “go beyond the psychic, beyond the situation of man in the 
world, even to the very source of man, of the world and of the psychic” (STE 8). 
It can ask, “what must a consciousness be, that emotions should be possible, 
perhaps that it should even be necessary?” (STE 11) It can investigate emotions 
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not as mere facts or appearances but as significant and meaningful phenomena. 
And it can treat emotions for what they really: “an organized form of human 
existence” (STE 12; see also STE 5, 9).  
It is clear that from the perspective of phenomenology, scientific approaches 
to affectivity are fundamentally limited. They cannot uncover the grounds of 
emotions; consequently, emotions’ full significance in human existence remains 
unarticulated. The point can be made even more forcefully. By missing the 
ontological and existential significance of emotions, scientific approaches to 
emotions have changed the subject—they appear to study not emotions (or the 
emotions of phenomenology) but something else. Psychology, Sartre 
concludes, “should recognize that emotion does not exist, considered as a 
physical phenomenon, for a body cannot be emotional, not being able to 
attribute a meaning to its own manifestations.” (STE 13)  
 
4. The Proper Distance Between Them 
It would be easy to conclude by declaring that there’s a methodological rift that 
separates evolutionary functional accounts of emotions and the 
phenomenological articulation offered by Sartre; by reminding one that even 
though both accounts make use of function, they understand function in distinct 
ways; and by cautioning one that the phenomena they study, though common in 
name, might after all be distinct in nature. Even though the tension between the 
two is undeniable, pointing out the tension is not the end of the story. The 
contrast between the two views should not lead to a kind of comparative and 
dialectical aporia, but rather to a productive conflict between two differing 
perspectives. Seen either from a phenomenological or evolutionary perspective, 
the gap between emotions as existentially significant and emotions as 
biologically grounded demands either a justification for its existence and 
persistence or our best efforts to bridge it.  
 
4.1. The Gap, as Seen from Biology 
Consider first the issue from an evolutionary functional perspective. One of 
Sartre’s main criticisms in the introductory section in the Sketch is that the 
psychology of emotions fails to consider the conditions for the possibility of 
emotions. Given its empirical nature, psychology treats emotions as accidents: 
unproblematic givens that demand precise characterization and categorization 
but which do not and cannot reveal anything fundamental about human nature. 
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Are evolutionary functional views guilty of such superficiality and of a single-
minded, even dogmatic, espousal of empiricism? It does not seem like it. 
Evolutionary views might be motivated by empirical considerations and findings 
but they are not exhausted by them. What is more, in their attempts to 
understand the nature of emotions they posit precisely what Sartre accuses 
psychological views of being unable to articulate: the essence of emotions. As 
discussed earlier, evolutionary views consider emotions to be adaptive 
mechanisms capable of providing solutions to pressing and recurring 
difficulties. The essence of emotions lies in their teleological functions. In this 
regard, emotions point to something beyond themselves; pace Sartre, facts 
about emotions are indeed significant. Emotions exist and because they do, they 
are indicative of a fundamental fact of human existence, namely, that humans are 
biological entities endowed not with fixed mechanisms or faculties by with a 
flexibility to shape themselves.  
Granted, most phenomenologists will not accept such a biological and 
evolutionarily driven characterization of affectivity and human existence. Still, 
their criticism cannot be that evolutionary accounts are dogmatically empirical, 
superficial, or somehow narrow. Evolutionary accounts of emotions neither fail 
to acknowledge the essence of emotions, nor do they treat emotions as mere 
accidents. Phenomenology’s disagreement with evolutionary psychology, if 
such a disagreement is genuine, will have to have a different source.  
The source, however, is not hard to locate. Most phenomenologists would 
point out that evolutionary accounts ascribe to emotions a biological 
significance, whereas their proper significance is personal (existential). And 
because personal significance is irreducible to biology, evolutionary accounts 
miss out on something essential to emotions. It is clear that such a view of the 
significance and consequently, of the essence of emotions is not one that can be 
accepted without argumentation. The irreducibility of facts about personal 
existence to facts about biological existence is a contentious claim and one that 
would be denied by most evolutionary views. What is more, evolutionary 
accounts can return the favor. They could object that if phenomenology insists 
on the irreducibility between the two types of facts, then it has rendered the 
biology of emotions mysterious. Any connection between their biological and 
experiential features would have to be taken as brute. It appears then that the 
existence of a gap between phenomenological and evolutionary approaches to 
emotions is merely the beginning and not the conclusion of a philosophically 
fruitful conversation between the two. 
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4.2. The Gap, as Seen from (Sartrean) Phenomenology 
A similar conclusion can be reached, I wish to show, if we were to adopt the 
perspective of Sartrean phenomenology. Isn’t Sartre, and indeed 
phenomenology itself, under the obligation to address the origin and biology of 
emotions? Isn’t there something deeply unsatisfactory by insisting that scientific 
approaches to emotions are inadequate and yet not explaining how an obvious 
fact about human existence—the fact that we are physical and biological beings—
figures into phenomenology’s explication of affectivity? In other words, doesn’t 
phenomenology owe us an explanation of how emotions arise out of our 
biological or physical nature?  
Even though Sartre does not seriously engage with evolutionary 
considerations—Darwin’s name is curiously absent from several of Sartre’s 
works—he still considers a more general version of the aforementioned 
questions. Instead of asking about emotions’ origin and relationship to biology, 
he asks about consciousness’ (the for-itself) origin and relationship to the world. 
His attitude toward those questions is ultimately ambivalent (Gardner, 2010). 
But this ambivalence is revealing: It shows that even for Sartre the existence of a 
gap between the personal and the biological cannot be the end of our 
phenomenological discussion of consciousness and affectivity.  
Faced with the question of the origin of consciousness, Sartre offers two 
answers that appear, prima facie at least, to be mutually exclusive—hence, his 
ambivalence. First, Sartre appears to dismiss the question as meaningless. 
Certainly, it is within his methodological right to assert that phenomenology is 
under no obligation to explain the emergence of emotions. Phenomenology has 
to take emotions’ existence as a given. It can theorize from their existence and 
can attempt to articulate the nature of the beings who are in possession of them. 
Yet, it cannot give an answer to the question of how emotions come to be. The 
question of the origin of emotions would require us to somehow step outside of 
the human perspective. But even if we were to do so (perhaps per impossible), 
we would come up empty-handed. Emotions as personal (existential) 
phenomena cannot be found outside the human perspective.  
In Being and Nothingness, Sartre discusses the limits of phenomenological 
inquiry when he considers the question of why there is a plurality of 
consciousness (i.e., other people) (BN 394-400). He admits that there are 
questions that cannot be answered through the human point of view. And such 
questions should be dismissed. At most, what one could say in response to such 
questions is that they are meaningless, because they ask us to do what cannot be 
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done, i.e., “to take a point of view on the totality” (BN 400); or they can be 
answered but only by pointing out “a fundamental contingency” (BN 399), 
namely, that things are how they are. So, emotions arise, we might say, because 
they are constitutive of human nature. But if we were to ask, “Why is human 
nature the way it is?”, we would have to respond with a simple “Because it is.”  
Sartre, however, is not entirely satisfied with such a deflationary approach to 
the question of the origin of consciousness (and thus, of emotions). In the 
Conclusion to Being and Nothingness, he raises explicitly the question about 
the genesis of the for-itself (consciousness). Not only that, but he denies that it 
is inappropriate to ask such a question. “The for-itself,” Sartre tells us, “is such 
that it has the right to turn back on itself toward its own origin” (BN 788; for 
discussion see Wilson, 2000). However, Sartre is quick to point out that even 
though we can pose such a question, we cannot pursue an answer to it through 
ontology. “To this question ontology cannot reply, for the problem here is to 
explain an event, not to describe the structures of a being” (BN 788). Indeed, 
raised within the perspective of ontology the question of the origin of 
consciousness becomes meaningless.  
 
Ontology here comes up against a profound contradiction since it is through 
the for-itself that the possibility of a foundation comes to the world. In order to 
be a project of founding itself, the in-itself would of necessity have to be 
originally a presence to itself—i.e., it would have to be already consciousness. 
(BN 789) 12 
 
We do not have access to the prehistory of consciousness, for there is no 
‘before’ before consciousness. Consequently, ontology cannot address the 
question of the origin of consciousness. 
All the same, and immediately after reaching this conclusion, Sartre 
announces that “metaphysics must nevertheless attempt to determine the nature 
and the meaning of this prehistoric process” (BN 790). For Sartre, it is thus 
metaphysics and not ontology that can engage with the question of the origin of 
consciousness. What is, however, the difference between the two? “[O]ntology 
appears to us capable of being defined as the specification of the structure of 
 
12  As Wilson (2000, pp. 55-6) points out, it is not entirely clear how to understand such a claim by Sartre 
given that earlier in Being and Nothingness he does appear to offer an ontological answer to the question of 
origin. Sartre writes: “For us, on the other hand, the appearance of the for-itself or absolute event refers indeed 
to the effort of an in-itself to found itself; it corresponds to an attempt on the part of being to remove 
contingency from its being” (BN 132-3).  
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being of the existent taken as a totality, and we shall define metaphysics rather 
as raising the question of the existent” (BN 395). Metaphysics can thus ask why 
questions—indeed, it can ask the (or one of the) most fundamental why 
questions. And as such, it can attempt to articulate a teleological description of 
consciousness’ origin.  
 
Why does the for-itself arise in terms of being? We, indeed, apply the term 
“metaphysical” to the study of individual processes which have given birth to 
this world as a concrete and particular totality. In this sense, metaphysics is to 
ontology as history is to sociology. (BN 788).  
 
It appears then that metaphysics can take us not only beyond appearances 
but also beyond the structure of our being, to our prehistory. Thus, even if our 
prehistory is not and cannot be given as prehistory to us, it must still be 
constitutive of our present. The past of consciousness is not a thing of the past. 
Consequently, our prehistory does not lie outside of our investigatory and 
theoretical bounds.  
Even so, metaphysical inquiry, Sartre insists, is limited insofar as questions 
concerning our prehistory must receive speculative answers.  
 
It is up to metaphysics to form the hypotheses which will allow us to conceive of 
this process as the absolute event which comes to crown the individual venture 
which is the existence of being. It is evident that these hypotheses will remain 
hypotheses since we can not expect either further validation or invalidation. 
What will make their validity is only the possibility which they will offer us of 
unifying the givens of ontology. (BN 790) 
 
This passage is crucial. Metaphysical answers to the question of the origin of 
emotions (and consciousness in general) will be judged not in terms of their 
veracity or accuracy but in terms of their utility. The metaphysical answer that 
we are looking for, although speculative and unverifiable, has to be one that 
accounts for the givens of ontology. But the givens of ontology include in 
addition to the existential significance of emotions, their embodied nature and 
biological origin. “[T]he body is what this consciousness is. It is not even 
anything except body. The rest is nothingness and silence” (BN 434). The 
question of the origin of consciousness arises naturally from within Sartre’s 
phenomenological ontology. On the one hand, the distinction between 
consciousness and the world has been established—consciousness lives in a 
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world that is not itself. On the other hand, we are entitled to question the 
prehistory of the structures of human existence because such structures are 
available to us for immediate descriptive analysis (Wilson 2000). Thus, through 
phenomenology itself, we are led to look outside of phenomenology—to a 
metaphysical investigation that can provide a theoretically fruitful account of the 
origin of consciousness. Sartrean phenomenology—or at least, my reading of it—
legitimatizes such metaphysical questioning. In doing so, it opens up the 
possibility for a type of philosophical inquiry on the nature of consciousness and 
emotions that would account for the origin of consciousness without denying its 
personal significance and, at least for Sartre, its freedom.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Although marked by a profound tension, a comparison between evolutionary 
functional views of emotions and phenomenological approaches proves to be a 
fruitful one. It reveals not just a difference between their respective 
understandings of emotions’ function but also a pressing need to bridge the gap 
between facts about biology, on the one hand, and facts about first-personal, 
conscious, and personal existence, on the other hand. The ambivalence that 
Sartre displays regarding the question of the origin of consciousness is 
important. We should not dismiss it, but take it to heart; as an attitude, it allows 
us to take both phenomenology and biology seriously. It is unclear whether 
there is a way of doing justice to both outlooks on emotions. All the same, such 
a reconciling effort is certainly worth our time. The problem that the existence 
and ubiquity of emotions pose is too important to ignore.  
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